Emails are unquestionably one of the most popular communication media these days.
emails, which also consume valuable resources, such as unnecessary expenses on filtering spam emails. For example, as reported by [13] , spam emails indirectly cost on the average each corporation 4.2 million dollars annually due to lost productivity of their employees who take, on an average, 10 minutes per day individually to sort out spam emails, which is on top of the work performed by IT staff in handling spam related issues within the company.
In fact, the driving force behind electronic communication these days causes the amount of time spent on processing emails to grow rapidly. As presented by the Radicati Group [7] Attempts have been made in reducing spam emails received daily by users, ranging from developing advanced spam filtering tools [4] to passing anti-spamming laws in the U.S.A. [6] to prevent spammer from sending unwanted emails. However, the percentage of spam emails that reach email users is growing, instead of reducing, and it has reached 78.5% of the total number of emails, as reported by Symantec [26] in March 2008.
One of the main reasons for the increased amount of spam emails is because they do not cost spammers anything: "Because email technology allows spammers to shift the costs almost entirely to third parties, there is no incentive for the spammers to reduce the volume" [10] . A significant issue of spam emails is their content: most of them are simple annoying; however, a considerable percentage of spam emails contain offensive materials.
Furthermore, spam emails that appear to be legitimate trick users into providing important personal information, i.e., phishing. For example, the Symantec report published in March 2008 shows that fraud and scams emails, in addition to emails with adult content, add up to more than 20% of the emails (see Figure 1(b) ).
Several approaches have been adopted in reducing the number of spam emails: (i) the machine learning approach, which uses a group of spam and legitimate emails for training a learning algorithm so that future incoming emails can be automatically categorized (as spam or legitimate) [4] . (ii) IP address filtering [4] , which is a heuristic approach that relies on the sender's IP address in an incoming email to determine its legitimate value. (iii) The Blacklist (Whitelist, respectively) method, which rejects (accepts, respectively) an email with address that can be found on the list. (iv) Cryptography [8] , which requires an email E to be digitally signed by an authorized correspondent; otherwise, E will be discarded by the filter. Unfortunately, spammers have found ways to evade these spam filtering tools, along with others, as shown by the number of spam emails received these days. Thus, we need more reliable and sophisticated approaches that are capable of minimizing, if not eliminating all of the, spam emails. P. Graham [5] has made a valid point in spam detection "I think it's possible to stop spam, and that content-based filters are the way to do it. The Achilles heel of the spammers is their message. They can circumvent any other barrier you set up. They have so far, at least. But they have to deliver their message, whatever it is. If we can write software that recognizes their messages, there is no way they can get around that."We believe (i) adopting the content-similarity approach, which compares incoming emails with spam emails marked by the user, and (ii) using the phrases, i.e., n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3), in the emails for detecting similar content, is the most promising method towards spam email
In this paper, we present a novel spam detection approach that first computes the degree of similarity of two emails, i.e., an incoming email E and a spam email S, according to the fuzzy correlation factors of words (i.e., unigrams) in E and S, which constitute phrase (of length 2 and 3) correlation values to determine whether E is spam with respect to S. The phrase matching approach has been applied successfully in detecting similar documents [9, 19] ; however, these previous works focus on exact phrase matching, instead of (inexact) similar phrase matching, which is more sophisticated and its accuracy has been verified by us with a 96% accuracy rate.
We proceed to present our results as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related work in filtering spam emails. In Section 3, we introduce our spam email detection approach, called SpamED, which measures the content similarity between incoming emails and known spam emails using the n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3) in the emails. In Section 4, we present the experimental results that validate the accuracy and effectiveness of SpamED in spam detection. In Section 5, we give a concluding remark. 1 The unigram, content-similarity detection approach has been proved successful in solving other problems, e.g., plagiarism detection which determines how similar an unknown document is to a known (copyright protected) document [15] .
2. Related work [20] describe in detail various machine learning algorithms to filter spam. On one hand, it has been proved that supervised machine learning is an effective and accurate technique for spam filtering. On the other hand, more trustworthy and representative datasets must be established to further validate the technique, which is difficult, since it is very hard to get hold of large and realistic email corpora due to privacy issues.
In [29] munging is developed as a tool that deliberately alternates an email address to make it unusable for e-mail harvesters who build e-mail lists for spamming purposes.
(For example, ng@cs.byu.edu could be munged as ng at cs dot byu dot edu.) This method can temporarily deceive most of the Web-based spambots, which are programs designed to collect email addresses from the Internet for constructing mailing lists to send spam mails.
Unfortunately, munging only provides a weak defense line in preventing user's email addresses from being harvested, since it is not difficult for spammers to adapt all sorts of existing munging actions.
[25] present another content-based approach, Relaxed Online SVM (Support Vector Machine), for detecting spam emails. Unlike ours, [25] rely on SVM, which is considered a robust methodology for text categorization. The results presented in [25] are encouraging; however, as stated in [25] , the SVM requires training time quadratic to the number of training examples, which is impractical for large-scale email systems running in real time to learn new spam email tricks, which change rapidly in diverting detection tools. [30] propose the use of ontologies to construct an effective framework to filter spam emails, since ontologies allow for machine-understandable semantics of data, which can be used in any system. A well-known problem of using ontologies for semantic matching is their lack of adaptation, i.e., whenever the semantic content changes, the ontologies must also be modified. Furthermore, the experimentation of the ontology approach in [30] is still in an inception phase, i.e., the model is going through a learning process.
Since emails usually include noisy data, [27] make use of data cleansing as a preprocessing step so that signatures, quotations, program codes, extra line breaks, extra spaces, and misspelled words can be detected and corrected to achieve high quality email mining. Experimental results in [27] show that when applying data cleansing to term extraction from emails, a significant improvement on extraction accuracy occurs. Compared with [27] , our spam email detection approach does not require incoming emails to be preprocessed, which speeds up the process of eliminating spam emails.
[11] suggest combining and correlating the outputs of multiple classifiers for improving accuracy and reducing false positives of spam detection. [11] analyze the relative gain and maximum possible accuracy that can be achieved for certain combinations of classifiers to automatically choose the best combination. As opposed to our detection approach, [11] rely upon the user's behavior models in detecting spam emails, a user relevance feedback strategy, which is not fully automated. Another drawback of the approach is that, as stated in [11] , behavior models are specific to a particular account, and hence the performance of the proposed method varies depending upon the quality of data available for modeling, the parameter settings, and the chosen thresholds. [3] concur that spam filters should block all spam and should unblock any legitimate messages, which is a common design goal of filtering spam emails. Since [3] suggest the use of blacklist and rule-based methods in their statistically-based, Naive Bayesian antispam filter to improve its effectiveness, the filtering method translates into higher computational cost.
Another spam email detection approach, as presented in [18] , is the TCP damping in which the receiving server calculates the spam score for an incoming message as the message is delivered and artificially delays confirmation of packets in the message for likely spam candidates. The receiver may specify a very small packet size, which would then subject the transmitter to high overhead and very inefficient transmission, which produces a significant slowdown for a sender who is distributing a message to a large pool of recipients who all flag the message as spam.
Since spam email generation techniques are continuously changing, methodologies and techniques are frequently updated in order to solve the spam email problem.
Unfortunately, none of the existing approaches or methodologies (including the ones mentioned above) are capable of making spam emails a thing from the past. These approaches without a doubt were helpful towards the solution of this matter; however, they are not infallible.
In [22] , we investigated the effectiveness of using (single-)word (i.e., unigram) similarity to detect junk emails with promising results. However, only an intuitive idea, i.e., a sketched design of the approach without any technical details, and limited experimental results of the junk-email detection method are reported in [22] . In this paper, we propose SpamED, a new spam-email detection approach, which enhances the accuracy of detecting spam emails by considering phrase similarity (as opposed to word similarity in [22] ), since as previously mentioned, phrases reflect much more accurately the content of a given document, i.e., an incoming email in this paper. In addition, we include the formal definition of word/phrase similarity, a thorough experimental study of SpamED, and performance evaluations between SpamED and other well-known spam-email detection approaches, such as Naive Bayes, Maximum Entropy, and Support Vector Machine.
Our spam-email detection approach
In this section, we introduce the overall design of SpamED, our spam email detection approach. In Section 3.1, we first discuss spam emails marked by the user, and in Section 3.2 we describe the process of computing the word (i.e., unigram) correlation factors that can be used for detecting spam emails. In order to minimize the number of false positives and false negatives during the process of detecting spam emails, in Section 3.3 we present the method that analyzes the content of the subject and the body of an incoming email for spam detection, since the subject of a legitimate email usually reflects the content of the body. Further enhancement of our spam detection approach is proposed in Section 3.4, in which we address the idea of enriching our unigram similarity matching by phrase matching using bigrams and trigrams to accurately asset the degree of similarity of an incoming email and a previously marked spam. The entire spam email detection process is described in Section 3.6. As the contents of spam emails are constantly changing, new spam emails might be missed by SpamED. In Section 3.7, we detail the process of adding newly marked spam emails to the original core. Another problem encountered by these email servers is the excessive number of false negatives generated in email filtering, i.e., newly arrived spam emails that are undetected even though they are very similar to the ones that have been labeled as spam, which we encounter on a daily basis. Unlike commercial email servers, our
SpamED not only obtains high success rate in detecting (similar) spam email (see Section 4) but also reduces the number of genuine emails treated as spam, which is vital to the user on account of the valuable information found in legitimate emails. We detail the design of our content-based spam email detection approach below.
In [15] , a set of Wikipedia documents (taken from http://www.wikipedia.org/) was used for computing the word(-to-word) similarity values, i.e., the correlation factors of words, according to the (i) frequency of occurrences and (ii) proximity (i.e., relative distance) of wordsF The normalized (word) correlation factor, which considers the size (in terms of the number of words) of each document in which the corresponding word appear, can be used for measuring the degree of similarity between words in any two given emails, a known spam email and an incoming email, by SpamED.
Word-to-Document correlation factors and email similarity
Using the (normalized) word correlation factor Ci,j between words i and j, we compute the similarity of each word in the content descriptor (i.e., the subject and the body) cde of an incoming email e addressed to user A to each of the words k in its counterpart cdj of a known spam email j marked by A in the core. The higher the (word-to-document) correlation factors between a word i in cde and the words in cdj, the higher the word-spam email factor μi,j , which is defined as
Example 1 Table 1 shows the correlation factors between (some of) the words in an incoming emailF Figure 2 , which is spam with respect to a previously marked spam email as shown in Figure 3 , whereas Table 2 shows (some of) the correlation factors between an (legitimate) incoming email in Figure 4 and the marked spam email in Figure 3 . As shown in Tables 1 and 2 , the correlation factors among the words of a legitimate and a spam email are lower than the ones between the two spam emails. □ Table 2 : The word-correlation factors of the legitimate email in Figure 4 and the spam email in Figure 3 Figure 2: A portion of an email that is spam with respect to the known spam email in Figure  3 Once the μ-value of each word in the content descriptor cde of an incoming email e with respect to the ones in cdj of a known spam email j is computed, we determine the degree of similarity between e and j using Equation 4, which calculates the average of the μ-value of each word ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in cde with respect to each of the words in cdj.
where n is the total number of words in cde, and Sime,j [0, 1].
Example 2 Using the μ-values of all the words in cde of the incoming email e in Figure 2 computed against every word in cdj of the spam email j in Figure 3 , we calculate the similarity value of the two emails using Equation 4, which yields Sime,j = 0.38. Furthermore, the similarity value between email e in Figure 4 and email j in Figure 3 is Sime,j = 0.11. □ To establish Sim-TH, experiments were conducted using (i) the test cases in the Sim-TH set (see Table 3 ) and (ii) each potential Sim-TH values. 6 We compute the content similarity between an incoming email e and each marked spam email j in the spam email core C until either Sime,j ≥ Sim-TH (i.e., e is spam) or Sime,j < Sim-TH for each spam email j in C (i.e., e is not spam). Figure 5 (b), the previously established threshold, which is 0.16, is the most ideal Sim-TH threshold value.
3.3.
Further enhancement of our detection approach
We have observed that when the similarity value between an incoming email e and a marked spam email is too close to the Sim-TH value, e might be misclassified, i.e., SpamED might yield either a false positive or false negative. In order to minimize the number of misclassified incoming emails (i.e., the sum of the false positives and the false negatives), e is further examined. We first establish an appropriate range close to the Sim-TH value for which incoming emails that fall into the range should be further analyzed in order to reduce the number of misclassified emails. To determine the range, we considered the test cases in the Sim-TH set again. We conducted experiments for diverse ranges close to the Sim-TH value and analyzed the results in order to obtain the appropriate range. We observed, and manually verified, that incoming emails that have a similarity value higher than 0.22 with respect to a marked spam email are highly likely spam, whereas emails with similarity value lower than 0.10 with respect to each spam email in the core are often legitimate. Thus, we considered different ranges between 0.10 and 0.22. Figure 6 ) and (ii) increases for any other ranges. Thus, we affirm that emails with the similarity values in the range between 0.12 and 0.20 are appropriate for further analysis.
Similarity between the subject and the body
We realize that the subject of a legitimate email e usually reflects the content of e, whereas a spam email tends to do the opposite. The subject of a spam email is usually misleading, since it is composed to catch the user's attention and induce the recipient to read the email with an appealing subject, using words such as Winner, Free, Re:, cheap, etc., or phrases such as Dear Friend, Make Money Fast, etc. Moreover, since it is well-known that the title of a document often reveals its content [16] , we further evaluate the relevance (in terms of words) between the subject and the body of an incoming email that has a degree of similarity between 0.12 and 0.20 with respect to a known spam email. Figure 6 : Different ranges considered for further analysis using the test cases in the Sim-TH set of emails in Table 3 with their similarity values close to the Sim-TH value (i.e., 0.16)
In order to obtain the similarity value, denoted SimSB, between the subject S and the body B of an incoming email e, we (i) calculate the μ-value of each word in the subject with respect to each of the words in the body of e, i.e., using the correlation factors and the μ-values between the words as defined in Equations 1-3 and (ii) normalize the result, since the longer the email, the higher the μ-values between the words in the subject and the body.
Using Equation 5 (given below), we obtain the similarity value between the subject S and the body B of an incoming email e that reflects how closely related S and B are (in terms of their content). The SimSB value is used by SpamED as an additional evidence to determine whether e (with a similarity value between 0.12 and 0.20) should be treated as spam or legitimate.
where ns (nb, respectively) is the number of words in the subject (body, respectively) of an incoming email. Table 4 shows the low correlation factor between the words in the subject and some of words in the body of the spam email in Figure 7 that translates into a low degree of similarity, which is SimSB(S,B) = 0.08, whereas Table 5 shows a higher correlation factor between the words in the subject and some of the words in the body of the legitimate email in Figure 8 that translates into a higher degree of similarity, which is SimSB(S,B) = 0.89. □ Table 4 : Correlation factors among the words in the subject and the body of the spam email as shown in Figure 7 Table 5: Correlation factors among the words in the subject and the body of the legitimate email as shown in Figure 8 
Determining the SB-TH value
We proceed to define the subject-body threshold value, denoted SB-TH value, which determines the minimum degree of similarity that the subject and the body of an email e should hold in order to be considered legitimate, assuming that 0.12 ≤ Sime,j ≤ 0.20 for any known spam email j. To establish the SB-TH value, we evaluated the results for diverse values of similarity between the subject and the body using the labeled emails in different test cases of a test set, denoted SB-TH set (as shown in Table 6 ). In order to be impartial, we collected this new test set in the same manner that the Sim-TH set (as shown in According to the test results shown in Figure 9 (a), we reaffirm that the subject of a legitimate email often reflects its content and establish 0.75 as an ideal SB-TH value, which ensures that neither the number of false positives nor the number of false negatives dominates the other.
Example 4
We benefit by the usage of the SB-TH value on the emails in Figures 7 and 8 .
The highest similarity value between the email in Figure 7 and the emails in the collected core of marked spam emails is 0.13, whereas the highest similarity value between the email in Figure 8 Figure 9 (b), the most ideal SB-TH value is 0.75, which is the same as the previously established SB-TH value and further confirms the correct choice of 0.75. Table 6 Figure 9(b) -False Positives (FPs), False Negatives (FNs), and Accuracy computed by using different SB-TH values and the test set Sim-TH2. Table 7 , which was constructed using the test cases in the SB-TH set in Table 6, shows that the number of false positives and false negatives is reduced when considering the SimSB value along with the similarity value between 0.12 and 0.20 (as detailed above)
of an incoming email and any known spam email. The accuracy of the enhanced approach (i.e., using SimSB) in detecting spam emails increases 5% (from 90% when considering only the similarity value of an incoming email and a spam email to 95% when considering the similarity value along with the SimSB value), which further enhances the performance of SpamED. Table 7 : M1, i.e., Method 1 (M2, i.e., Method 2, respectively) yields the results on using only the Sim-TH value (SB-TH value in addition to the Sim-TH value, respectively), according to the test cases in the SB-TH set as shown in Table 6 3.4.
The bigram and trigram detection method
As stated and supported by an empirical study in [21] , the usage of short phrases (2 and 3 words) has a more positive impact on retrieval effectiveness than using phrases of longer length (i.e., 4, 5, or more), since bigrams and trigrams increase the number of relevant documents retrieved. ( [21] claim that the usage of phrases of length 4 or longer tends to yield unreliable results.) Hence, in addition to the unigram detection method (as discussed in Sections 3.1-3.3), we further consider the bigrams and trigrams in emails to compute their similarity, which should decide whether the accuracy of SpamED on unigrams can be enhanced. If any email contains n words, there are n different unigrams, n-1 bigrams, and n-2 trigrams to be considered.
In order to compute the n-gram (2 ≤ n ≤ 3) correlation factor of any two n-gram p1
and p2, we rely on the correlation factor of each pair of corresponding i th (1 ≤ i ≤ n) words within p1 and p2 and apply the Odds (ratio) [14] on the word correlation factors. The Odds measures the predictive or prospective support based on a hypothesis H (i.e., n-grams) using the prior knowledge p(H) (i.e., the word correlation factors of the n-grams) to determine the strength of a belief, which is the phrase correlation factor in our case.
We compute the phrase correlation factor (pcf) between any two bigrams (trigrams, respectively) p1 and p2 as (7) where p1i and p2i are the i th (1 ≤ i ≤ 2 for bigrams or 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 for trigrams) word in p1 and p2, respectively, and C is the normalized word correlation factor as defined in Equation 2.
Hence, the phrase correlation factor of p1 and p2 is generated by using the word correlation factor of each corresponding pair of words in p1 and p2. Sample bigram and trigram correlation factors are shown in Tables 8 and 9 , respectively. Table 8 : Correlation factors of some bigrams in the two emails as shown in Figures 2 and 3 Using the generated phrase correlation factors, we compute the degree of correlation value between a bigram (trigram, respectively) pi in an incoming email e and each one of the bigrams (trigrams, respectively) in a spam email j, denoted μpi,j , as defined in Equation Furthermore, using the computed n-gram (2 ≤ n ≤ 3) correlation factors, as well as the degree of phrase correlation μpi,j , we can establish the degree of similarity of e and j, i.e.,
Sime,j , as shown in Equation 4
, where n in this computation denotes the total number of distinct n-grams in e. Table 9 : Correlation factors of some trigrams in the two emails as shown in Figures 2 and 3 
3.5.

Considering the usage of email arrival time in SpamED
During the designing phase of SpamED, we have attempted to enhance its accuracy by considering the time of arrival [24] of an email e, since we observed that most spam emails arrived during the late evening or early morning hours. We used the SB-TH set (in Table 6 ) to compare the number of misclassified emails close to the Sim-TH value against the arrival time, i.e., we computed the arrival time t of e with 0.12 ≤ Sime,j ≤ 0.20 for any spam email j in the user's core. If t is in between 11 p.m. and 5 a.m., then e was treated as spam; otherwise, it was treated as legitimate. Table 10 , in which the accuracy percentage is computed according to the total number of emails in its respective test case in Table 6, shows that SpamED using the SB-TH value on unigrams outperforms the method using the arrival time of emails by a huge margin. Therefore, our SpamED uses the SB-TH value, instead of the arrival time of an incoming email, since the latter is not an accurate indicator in minimizing false positives and false negatives during the spam detection process. Table 6 3.6. The entire spam email detection process
In this section, we describe the overall process each incoming email e must go through in order to determine whether e should be treated as (non-)spam. The detailed process of our SpamED is shown in Figure 10 .
As shown in Figure 10 , when a new email e arrives (1), SpamED computes the degree of similarity (4) between e and a previously marked spam email s in the core (2) using the word (unigram)-correlation factors in its corresponding matrix (3) (which are used to determine the bigram and trigram correlation factors) on n-grams
The computed degree of similarity of e and s is then compared with the corresponding n-gram Sim-TH value, which is different among the chosen unigrams, bigrams, or trigrams, as shown in Figure 10 . The process of computing Sim-TH, as well as SimSB, for bigrams (trigrams, respectively) is the same as the unigrams for which the same test cases were used, and the chosen threshold is the one that yields the minimal number of false positives and false negatives. If the degree of similarity of e and s is lower (higher, respectively) than the Sim-TH value, then e is treated as legitimate (5) (spam (6), respectively). Otherwise, Sime,s falls into the respective Sim-TH range, which requires further consideration (see discussion in Section 3.3), and the degree of similarity between the subject and the body of e is computed, i.e., SimSB(e, s), (7) . If SimSB(e, s) is higher than the respective threshold SB-TH, then e is treated as a legitimate email (8); otherwise, it is spam (9). Table 11 shows that the number of misclassified emails (i.e., false positives and false negatives) is reduced when spam emails that are not previously detected by SpamED (since they are new) are added to the core of marked spam emails. As a result, the accuracy of using Method B is 8% above the accuracy of using Method A. Table 7 and Case C is shown in Table 3 4
. Experimental results
In order to assess the performance of SpamED, we applied SpamED on three 
where the Number of Correctly-Detected Emails is the total number of emails minus the number of false positives and false negatives. Figure 11 shows the accuracy and error rates of using SpamED on the three corpora and different n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3), as well as the average accuracy and average error rates. The results demonstrate that the use of trigrams achieves the highest degree of accuracy (and hence the lowest error rate) among all the ngrams, since trigrams successfully reduce the highest number of misclassified spam and legitimate emails. We further measured the spam precision (p) and spam recall (r) [1] as given in Equation 9 , which reflect the precision and recall ratio of SpamED in detecting spam emails, respectively.
where NS→S denotes the number of spam emails correctly classified by SpamED, and NL→S (NS→L, respectively) denotes the number of legitimate (spam, respectively) emails that were treated as spam (legitimate, respectively), i.e., false positives (false negatives, respectively). In addition, we computed the overall performance of SpamED using the Harmonic Mean (also called F-measure), a commonly used measure that avoids the bias created by (spam) precision or (spam) recall, which is defined as . Figure 12 shows the spam precision, spam recall, and F-measure for each of the email corpora using unigrams, which also includes the average performance of SpamED, whereas Figure 13 shows that the trigram approach outperforms the unigram and bigram approaches in terms of the overall F-Measure. Since legitimate emails contain valuable information, it is important to find another measure that reflects the deficiency of eliminating a legitimate email. We adopted the weighted accuracy and the weighted error rates [1, 17] , as defined in Equation 10, which assign a false positive a higher cost than a false negative. Each legitimate email is treated as if it were a λ email. As in [1] , we establish several values for λ (= 1, 9, and 999) to penalize false positives by λ times, where λ represents an adequate number of emails. If a legitimate email e is misclassified, then it yields a λ-error, whereas if e is classified correctly, then it yields a λ-success.
where NS denotes the total number of spam emails, NL denotes the total number of legitimate emails, NL→L denotes the number of legitimate emails correctly classified, and NS→S (NS→L and NL→S, respectively) is defined as in Equation 9.
When λ = 1, discarded legitimate emails are not assigned any weight higher than the weight of spam emails that reach the user's inbox. When λ = 999, discarded legitimate emails are severely penalized, since in this case blocked emails are directly deleted. [1] recommend using λ = 9, which indicates that blocked emails are not deleted automatically, a general practice. Furthermore, λ = 9 can be used to compute the Total Cost Ratio (TCR), as defined in Equation 12 , as a single measurement of the performance of a spam email filtering approach.
Since when λ is assigned a high value, WAcc is also high, and as a result the performance (in terms of accuracy) can be misinterpreted. Hence, [1] suggest comparing
WAcc and WErr to a simplistic baseline in order to obtain a more adequate evaluation of a spam email detection approach. The adopted baseline was "no filter is present." The weighted accuracy and error rate of the baseline [1] and its respective TCR are defined in [1] as (11) and (12) Figure 14 : WAcc and WErr calculated for SpamED using the BYU, TREC05, and TREC06 corpora by setting λ = 9 on different n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3)
As mentioned in [1] , an effective spam detection approach should achieve a TCR value higher than 1 in order to claim its usefulness. Figure 14 shows that when λ = 9, the overall weighted accuracy of SpamED using any n-gram (1 ≤ n ≤ 3) on the three email corpora is around 96% on the average, whereas Table 12 shows the TCR values using λ = 1 (TCR1) and λ = 9 (TCR9), which were calculated using the same three email corpora, along with the overall result. In both cases, i.e., TCR1 and TCR9, the TCR values are higher than 1 (for all three email corpora), and the overall weighted error rate average is lower than 6%.
Hence, we can affirm that SpamED is accurate and useful when implemented in real world Note that even when misclassifying legitimate emails (false positives) is penalized nine times over the misclassified spam emails (as shown in Figure 14) , the overall accuracy of SpamED is still in the 95% range in most test cases. Thus, we assert that not 9 The greater TCR is, the better the email filtering tool performs.
only SpamED is accurate in eradicating spam emails, but also keeps to a minimum the number of legitimate emails that are misclassified. Figure 14 shows that the weighted accuracy (WAcc) for the TREC05 and TREC06 corpora is higher when using bigrams, since its number of misclassified legitimate emails is reduced; however, its number of misclassified spam emails is significantly higher than the one obtained by using unigrams or trigrams. On the average, trigrams used by SpamED achieve the highest WAcc rate, as well as the lowest WErr rate, among all the n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3). Furthermore, we have also computed the TCR values (when λ = 9) using unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams as shown in Figure 15 . On the average, the use of trigrams is more effective and outperforms unigrams. Since when the weighted accuracy was computed, only the misclassified legitimate emails are penalized, it causes bigrams to perform slightly better than trigrams in terms of TCR values. In addition, Figure 16 shows that by using trigrams in detecting spam emails, we can improve the overall performance of SpamED by close to 2% over unigrams and bigrams, since the overall weighted error rate drops to close to 4%. Table 12 : Total cost ratio (TCR) calculated for the BYU, TREC05, and TREC06 corpora using unigrams Figure 15 : TCR9 values computed by using SpamED on different n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3) in the BYU, TREC05, and TREC06 email corpora In [1] a Naive Bayesian Classifier is adopted and in [32] a number of supervised (learning) approaches are presented for filtering unsolicited bulk e-mails. The Naive the context of statistical spam filtering, which include (i) the Naive Bayes and Maximum
Entropy model [31] that estimate the probability of each spam or legitimate category being predicted, (ii) the memory-based approach, which is a non-parametric inductive learning paradigm that stores training instances (i.e., emails) and then labels a new email according to its similarity with a stored instance, (iii) the Support Vector Machine (SVM), which is a supervised learning paradigm so that given a set of training data (labeled as spam and legitimate), SVM establishes the distance between a new instance (i.e., an incoming email) and the classification hyperplane to determine whether the email should be treated as (non-)spam, and (iv) the AdaBoost, which is a framework for constructing an accurate classification rule to detect spam emails. [32] also make use of the information within the email header to detect spam emails. Since the spam filtering approaches presented in [1, 32] have been well-established, we consider them to be an ideal choice for performance evaluation against SpamED. header fields within the emails were not included), which was also used in [1, 32] and (ii) SpamAssasin (http://spamassassin.org/public corpus), a public corpus that includes 1,897
spam and 4,150 legitimate messages.
[1] and [32] both make use of cost sensitive measures presented in [1] , which allow us to compare the performance of different approaches with SpamED. Figure 17 shows that the TCR9 value obtained by SpamED is at least 2.5 times higher than the one obtained in 
Observations
As discussed earlier, trigrams outperform bigrams and unigrams. Even though both trigrams and bigrams can reduce the number of misclassified legitimate emails (generated by using unigrams), trigrams is more capable than bigrams in reducing the number of misclassified spam emails, since the number of false negatives obtained using unigrams drops significantly when using trigrams but decreases only slightly (and in some cases increase) when using bigrams. We observe that when computing the phrase correlation factors, exact (or closely similar) matches on longer phrases (i.e., trigrams) significantly increase the phrase-to-document correlation factors, which contributes to higher degree of similarity of two similar emails, i.e., an incoming email and a spam, that leads to higher accuracy in spam email detection.
In addition, since supervised learning approaches use (non-)spam emails to train algorithms in search of different patterns, such us the arrival time of an email and frequent words appeared in an email, in order to predict the probability of an email being spam [23] ,
while SpamED relies on the actual similarity of trigrams in emails, it might explain why phrase similarity approach is more accurate than the supervised learning approaches in spam email filtering.
Conclusions
Unquestionably, spam emails are a burden for any kind of users (from household to student to business users) and need to be eradicated. According to the Radicati Group SpamED, that makes use of the correlation factors among words in emails to discover spam emails. By considering the similarity of words between previously marked spam emails and new incoming emails, SpamED establishes how similar (in terms of the content of) any two emails are. In addition, by using phrases (i.e., bigrams and trigrams) within the content of any two emails to compute their similarity, we are able to further enhance the accuracy of SpamED without using other existing spam-email detection methods proposed in literature, such as Blacklist [2] , Whitelist [17] , the time of arrival of emails [17] , use of ruled-based heuristic centralized gateway filtering [17] , digital signature [12] , etc. Most of these techniques are rather inflexible, e.g., Blacklist (Whitelist, respectively) would only reject (accept, respectively) email with addresses specified in its corresponding list and need the user's constant feedback. SpamED, on the other hand, only requires the users to occasionally mark spam emails to be added to the user's core of spam emails, which minimizes the processing time and overhead in eliminating spam emails.
Experimental results have verified the correctness of our spam email detection approach. Not only using SpamED on trigrams yields an accuracy of 96% in detecting spam emails, but it also reduces the number of misclassified emails, i.e., the number of false negatives and (most importantly) false positives decreases.
For future work, we are interested in constructing phrase correlation matrices for bigrams and trigrams using phrases within the Wikipedia documents (since they are unbiased). The computed phrase correlation factors in each matrix can be used to calculate the degree of similarity between any two emails, which could further enhance our spam detection approach in detecting spam emails more accurately than using solely word correlation factors in generating phrase correlation factors. In addition, we would like to further reduce the number of false positives (i.e., misclassified legitimate emails), since as suggested in [11] , in the real world misclassifying even one legitimate email is unacceptable. We believe this can be achieved by assigning different weights for common spam words, such as "free" or "money" [4] , or phrases such as "Consolidate debt" or "No obligation" [28] , in SpamED.
